Efter veckans händelser tror jag inte någon betvivlar att det finns motsättningar i USA. Men även bortsett från attacken mot Kapitolium — och att 18% eller 45% av republikanska väljare stödde det, beroende på vilken enkät man tror på — är det tydligt att motsättningarna växt fram under en längre tid.
I en fascinerande serie av intervjuer exemplifierar Politico hur olika frågor Trump resp Biden-väljare tar upp:
The bottom line, (the Trump voter) said, is that “The Democrats have gone completely nuts, with ‘defund the police,’ open borders, tolerance of riots, 1619, men can become women/women can become men, socialism, etc.” […]
In conclusion, (the Biden voter) itemized the “big problems” facing the country—from racial inequality to climate change, old infrastructure to health care costs […]
Låt oss börja med att titta på motsättningarna ur ett internationellt perspektiv. Science Magazine skriver om en ny undersökning som visar att polariseringen ökat i USA sedan 1970-talet (men minskat i t.ex Sverige!), och hur hatet mot “det andra partiet” är större i USA än i något annat land i undersökningen:
A recent study offers valuable international perspective on political polarization, leveraging data from 1975 through 2017 in nine Western democracies to examine feelings toward copartisans and opposing partisans. […] Four nations—America, Canada, New Zealand, and Switzerland—exhibit increasing sectarianism over time, with the rate steepest in America. By contrast, Australia, Britain, Norway, Sweden, and Germany exhibit decreasing sectarianism over time. […] By 2017, out-party hate was stronger in America than in any other nation.
Den här analysen från Pew visar också hur medianpositionerna förändrats under åren:
Partierna har alltså blivit betydligt mer homogena under åren, med tydliga länkar mellan olika socioekonomiska grupper, identitet och partitillhörighet:
Whereas self-identified liberals and conservatives used to be distributed broadly between the two parties, today the former are overwhelmingly Democrats and the latter are overwhelmingly Republicans. The parties also have sorted along racial, religious, educational, and geographic lines. Although far from absolute, such alignment of ideological identities and demography transforms political orientation into a mega-identity that renders opposing partisans different from, even incomprehensible to, one another.
Ett exempel: för 40 år sen var 50% av vita som gick i kyrkan varje vecka demokrater, dvs kyrkbesök sa inget om partitillhörighet. Nu har andelen demokrater halverats.
Tyvärr är misstron mellan de två partierna stark. Före valet i november ansåg nio av tio — både republikaner och demokrater — att det skulle leda till “varaktig skada” för landet om motståndarsidan vann.
Att det finns olika åsikter om målfunktioner i ett samhälle är ju hälsosamt i en demokrati, men forskarna konstaterar att utvecklingen i USA präglas av ett avsky mot “den andra sidan” som inte funnits tidigare. Man anser inte bara att den andra sidan har fel, utan att vad de gör är moralistiskt förkastligt. Jonathan Haidt och andra samhällsvetenskapliga forskare har analyserat hur liberala och konservativa väljare värdesätter olika moraliska fundament:
consistently found that liberals valued Care and Fairness more than did conservatives, whereas conservatives valued Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity more than did liberals
I takt med att de flesta liberaler samlats i det demokratiska partiet, och de flesta med konservativa värderingar i det republikanska, ökar risken för att man ser på “det andra partiet” som folk med en moraliskt förkastlig syn.
And once you get into a framework of seeing your fellow citizens as good versus evil based on their group, it’s kind of a mirror image of the authoritarian populism on the right. Any movement that is assigning moral value to people just by looking at them is a movement I want no part of.
Att moraliska fundament avgör val betyder inte att de sakpolitiska frågorna inte kan ändras över tid. En analys pekar t ex på att invandringsmotstånd enar republikaner mer idag än abortmotstånd, som klassiskt varit en fokusfråga.
Tidigare avgjordes en identitet av ens åsikter. Nu verkar det snarare som ens åsikter avgörs av ens identitet:
Along the way, the causal connection between policy preferences and party loyalty has become warped, with partisans adjusting their policy preferences to align with their party identity. For example, a recent experiment demonstrated that Republicans exhibit a liberal attitude shift after exposure to a clip of President Donald Trump voicing a liberal policy position; there is little evidence to suggest that Democrats are immune to analogous shifts in response to their own political leaders.
Även om de två partierna på nationell nivå ligger nära 50/50, så är republikanerna dominerande i väldigt många småorter och demokraterna i många (men färre) större städer:
Trump won 2,586 counties to Biden’s 527. […] Trump won many smaller counties this year, while Biden pulled majorities in some of the nation’s largest counties, such as Los Angeles County in California and Maricopa County in Arizona.
Så för många amerikaner är det ganska klart vilket politiskt val som är “normen” och vad man förväntar sig att alla i ens egen geografiska, sociala eller etniska grupp tycker:
And in a sign of how much Americans of both parties are living in political bubbles, many expressed surprise that Mr. Biden could have won, given that they knew no one who voted for him.
Ens grupptillhörighet styr ens socialiserande — och till och med ens arbetsplats. Och givet att man ser partier som olika “tävlande lag” är det kanske inte konstigt att man i högre grad letar efter sin partner i samma lag som sig själv. Och om båda föräldrarna tycker lika exponeras inte heller barnen för andra åsikter:
[…] political correspondence between married couples and parent-offspring agreement have both increased substantially in the polarized era. We further demonstrate that the principal reason for increased spousal correspondence is mate selection based on politics. Spousal agreement, in turn, creates an “echo chamber” that facilitates intergenerational continuity.
Och ju mer lika alla runt en tycker, desto svårare är det att ha en saklig diskussion för att förstå den andra sidan:
“each side’s coalition thinks of itself as a kind of ‘silent majority,’ and they are surrounded by so many like-minded people it’s a very easy assumption to fall into.”
The trouble with this […] is “if both sides think they already have a majority, two things follow: One: you don’t have to persuade people who don’t already share your views, and two: if you suffer political setbacks, it’s because of something unfair, something illegitimate that has happened. On the right […], it tends to be the ‘Deep State,’ or the media, or voter fraud has stolen these elections from you. And on the left, it’s the Koch brothers, it’s the Russians, it’s ‘Dark Money.’”
Analyserna efter stormningen av Kapitolium i onsdags pekar också på att många faktiskt tror på de lögner som Trump och andra republikanska ledare uttalat under lång tid:
Människor lever med helt olika syn på vad som hände i valet och även vad som hände igår kväll, vilket är ännu mer chockerande, säger Lars Trägårdh i SVT:s sändning.
Många Trump-fans verkar in i det sista tro att han på något sätt skulle “vinna”:
Polls have presented a stark picture of alternate realities. A Fox News poll released on Friday found that 77 percent of those who cast ballots for Mr. Trump said they thought the election had been stolen from him. Just 10 percent of Democrats agreed. Another survey, conducted by Bright Line Watch in late November, found that among those who said they approved of Mr. Trump’s performance in office, about half believed that he — not Joseph R. Biden Jr. — would be inaugurated in January.
Varför har det blivit så här i USA? Undersökningen om polarisering mellan länder konstaterar att eftersom utvecklingen går åt olika håll i olika länder så torde det tyda på att landsspecifika skäl driver utvecklingen snarare än globala:
These findings are most consistent with explanations of polarization based on changes that are more distinctive to the US (e.g., changing party composition, growing racial divisions, the emergence of partisan cable news), and less consistent with explanations based on changes that are more universal (e.g., the emergence of the internet, rising economic inequality).
I många polariserade länder har individuella ledare drivit på förändringen, för att konsolidera sin maktposition, men så har det inte varit historiskt i USA. Det innebär också att ett skifte till andra ledare som betonar enighet inte i sig löser problemet:
Partisan sentiment bubbled up from the belly of American society, not the head. [..] In most other seriously polarized countries, charismatic leaders were the main contributors to the schism. Not so in the United States. Until recently, there was no American equivalent to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey or President Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. [..] Donald Trump is a startling exception in this regard. He is the first U.S. president within living memory to wield polarization as a core political strategy, deliberately seeking to intensify partisan emotions around the most divisive issues facing the country. But his administration is as much a symptom as it is a cause of polarization. [..] In the United States, by contrast, partisanship has continually deepened over the last five decades, regardless of who has occupied the White House. The lesson is clear: Trump’s eventual departure may temper America’s polarization fever, but it will not cure the malady.
Men även om han inte är källan till polariseringen har Trump utnyttjat den som ingen annan amerikanska president i modern tid (även om enskilda demokratiska politiker också har symboliskt försökt protestera mot rösträkningar i val som gått emot dem):
Stedman [ingen släkting!]: Part of Donald Trump’s strategy since 2016 was to cast doubt on our electoral legitimacy. This strategy was amplified during the pandemic when so much of the country implemented early voting and vote by mail, which Trump and his acolytes relentlessly criticized as fraudulent methods. His strategy was aided and abetted by Fox News and its commentators, as well as by various social media personalities and websites.
Så vad finns det mer för USA-specifika skäl som drivit polarisering? Man kan tänka sig att det ganska unika amerikanska tvåpartisystemet kan vara en faktor:
America’s relatively rigid, two-party electoral system stands apart by collapsing a wide range of legitimate social and political debates into a singular battle line that can make our differences appear even larger than they may actually be. And when the balance of support for these political parties is close enough for either to gain near-term electoral advantage – as it has in the U.S. for more than a quarter century – the competition becomes cutthroat and politics begins to feel zero-sum, where one side’s gain is inherently the other’s loss.
Även FiveThirtyEight är inne på samma sak:
With the two parties now fully nationalized, deeply sorted by geography and culture, and locked in a tightly contested, zero-sum battle over “the soul of the nation” and the “American way of life,” it’s nearly impossible to break that cycle.
Att väljare i högre och högre grad har olika nyhetskällor ses också som en stor anledning till att deras världsbild glidit isär, även om det inte är unikt för USA:
Basically, we’ve moved from an “information commons” in which Americans of all political stripes and walks of life encountered the same news coverage from well-regarded journalists and news organizations to a more fragmented, high choice environment featuring news providers who no longer subscribe to the norms and standards of fact-based journalism. The increased availability of news with a slant coupled with the strengthened motivation to encounter information that depicts opponents as deplorable has led to a complete breakdown in the consensus over facts.
Även om sociala medier i sig inte är orsaken till polariseringen, och Twitter funkar likadant i alla länder, kan man tänka sig att när man väl har fått en polarisering kan sociala medier snabbt accelerera det:
In other words, social media turns many of our most politically engaged citizens into Madison’s nightmare: arsonists who compete to create the most inflammatory posts and images, which they can distribute across the country in an instant while their public sociometer displays how far their creations have traveled. […] The News Feed’s algorithmic ordering of content flattened the hierarchy of credibility. Any post by any producer could stick to the top of our feeds as long as it generated engagement. “Fake news” would later flourish in this environment, as a personal blog post was given the same look and feel as a story from The New York Times.
Som svensk nyhetskonsument är det lätt att få intrycket att många republikanska åsikter blir mer och mer extrema, och det verkar ligga mycket i det, både vad gäller republikanska politiker och extrema element. (Låt oss lämna Trump personligen utanför just den här diskussionen — men även innan veckans händelser var det tydligt att han gör unik skada på USA:s institutioner genom att medvetet öka polariseringen i landet för att cementera sin makt, såsom Milosevic och andra desperata autokrater.)
Men det är viktigt att komma ihåg att också demokratiska positioner ändrats mycket på kort tid:
For all the attention paid to the politics of the far right in the Trump era, the biggest shift in American politics is happening somewhere else entirely. In the past five years, white liberals have moved so far to the left on questions of race and racism that they are now, on these issues, to the left of even the typical black voter. This change amounts to a “Great Awokening” — comparable in some ways to the enormous religious foment in the white North in the years before the American Civil War. It began roughly with the 2014 protests in Ferguson, Missouri […]
White Democrats suddenly started expressing dramatically higher levels of concern about racial inequality and discrimination, while showing greater enthusiasm for racial diversity and immigration. […] As white liberals became more vocal about racial inequality, more racially conservative Democrats left the party and helped power Donald Trump’s electoral victory.
Vad kan då göras? Ett självklart behov av förändring handlar om att återupprätta ett politiskt samtal som inte är byggt på desinformation, och det gäller inte bara Trump utan även republikanska politiker som möjliggjort honom:
To knowingly pretend a lie is true is, simply put, to lie. Doing that carefully enough to let you claim you’re only raising questions only makes it even clearer that you know you’re lying. Lying to people is no way to speak for them or represent them. It is a way of showing contempt for them, and of using them rather than being useful to them. This is what too many Republican politicians have chosen to do in the wake of the election. They have decided to feign anger at a problem that cannot be solved because it does not exist, and this cannot help but make them less capable of taking up real problems on behalf of their voters. And in any case, it makes them cynical liars.
Pointing to Democrats who have done the same in the past is incriminating, not exonerating. “Barbara Boxer did it too” is not an argument for very much worth doing. And the notion that they’re only doing it to make sure their voters’ voices are heard is an admission of derelict leadership.
Science-artikeln pekar på vikten av att politiker har incitament att vara goda föredömen:
A third avenue involves creating incentives for politicians and other elites to reduce their sectarianizing behaviors. People become less divided after observing politicians treating opposing partisans warmly, and nonpartisan statements from leaders can reduce violence. Campaign finance reform may help, especially by eliminating huge contributions from ideological extremists. Reducing partisan gerrymandering likely would make representation fairer, generate more robust competition in the marketplace of political ideas, and send fewer extremists to the House of Representatives
Likaså pekar en grupp f.d. senatorer, från båda partierna, på vikten att skapa en kultur av förståelse och respekt, både i politiken och utanför:
[…] would include consideration of ideas that enhance a culture of understanding and respect across the aisle and help set a tone of cooperation for the incoming 117th Senate. […] America’s public trust — the indispensable element of democracy’s survival — is shrinking. We urge the Senate of 2021 to step back from the dangerous scorched-earth partisanship of recent years and to step forward as an enlightened role model helping to lead America toward a more civil and respectful society and, thus, “a more perfect union.”
Jonathan Haidt lyfter även fram vikten av intellektuell nyfikenhet och öppenhet (kul att Sverige kan bidra till debatten här…):
“They have a word in Swedish, åsiktskorridor, the ‘opinion corridor,’ they call it: ‘Here is where your opinions are allowed to be. You cannot step outside.’” Heterodox Academy is part of a movement to allow people to step outside the narrow opinion corridor, to challenge prejudices and preconceptions, and to return the academy to one of its core purposes.
David Brooks pekar på den bistra sanningen att kortsiktiga utbildningsinsatser för att ändra normer och beteenden ofta inte funkar, utan att det enda som funkar är att blanda olika sorters människor. Det gäller nog kring politiska åsikter också.
The superficial way to change minds and behavior doesn’t seem to work, to bridge either racial, partisan or class lines. Real change seems to involve putting bodies from different groups in the same room, on the same team and in the same neighborhood. That’s national service programs. That’s residential integration programs across all lines of difference. That’s workplace diversity, equity and inclusion — permanent physical integration, not training.
This points to a more fundamental vision of social change, but it is a hard-won lesson from a bitterly divisive year.
Men hur får man demokrater och republikaner att börja umgås, på jobbet och privat? Någonstans måste ju “det goda samtalet” börja med de relationer man redan har, t.ex. familjen:
Of course, most Americans avoid talking politics at family get-togethers in the first place because they worry that political disagreements will ruin the holidays. But this is a mistake. […] Our survey showed that when our social circles include a more diverse mix of political beliefs, we are more open to argument and less ideologically extreme. And, arguably, the best way to get to this point is to discuss — and disagree about — politics more.
Och utöver att bygga och behålla relationer med en heterogen skara människor finns det säkert många “verktyg” från socialpsykologi — t.ex. parterapi — som kan vara hjälpsamma:
The skills workshop teaches workshoppers how to do this with specially designed techniques for listening and speaking to people whose political views differ from their own. […] Living Room Conversations, Bridge the Divide, Make America Dinner Again—all have the same goal of calming our heated debate by bringing well-meaning people out of their cultural bubbles […]
“Our job here today is to learn how you maintain, or create, a good relationship with people even though you don’t agree with them,” one of the moderators said on that sunny Sunday at the library in Northern Virginia. “We’re not here to learn how to convince each other of some political agenda.”
Låt oss avsluta med en hoppfull tanke. I bästa fall har nu splittringen gått så långt — inte minst efter onsdagens händelser — att det nu äntligen, ironiskt nog, kanske är lättare att ändra riktning (på samma sätt som befolkningen blir “krigströtta” efter långa krig):
[…] the political equivalent of Newton’s third law: For every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. […] And so that is actually my main source of hope, that things are so bad now and the fact that we can’t even confront a pandemic because of our polarization. We can’t share facts, we can’t share strategies, we can’t coordinate behavior because of our polarization. I think this will become increasingly clear.
Det var allt för idag.
Vidarebefordra gärna nyhetsbrevet till dina vänner om du gillar det, och prenumerera om du inte redan gör det. Vi hörs nästa söndag!
—Jacob